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In an age of instantaneous information retrieval, two years
since promulgation would seem an ample period of time to begin
to assess how courts have received the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
In truth, of course, it will take a considerably longer period before
one will be able to report with confidence as to how the Restatement
has done. Unlike Section 402A of the Second Restatement, which
consisted of only one section with limited commentary, the Products
Liability Restatement contains twenty-one separate sections with ex-
tensive commentary on each section. Together with Reporters'
Notes, it fills a book. Given its magnitude, the courts cannot be
expected to respond to the new Restatement as a unitary whole. In-
stead they will consider it provision by provision, as the need arises.
This process will, perforce, take time.
Notwithstanding these disclaimers, it is possible, even at this
early date, to report that the Products Liability Restatement has been
warmly received by the courts. It has been cited in more than 170
reported decisions. In some areas it is clear that the Restatement po-
sitions will carry the day and provide closure on issues that have up
to now been somewhat problematic. In others, minority views will
continue to be expressed. In yet others, the Restatement's position
has been formally rejected. Taken as a whole, the case law to date
clearly demonstrates that, unlike the dire prediction of the plain-
tiffs' bar that the Restatement would be utilized exclusively as a tool
for defendants to stifle legitimate claims, in reality plaintiffs have
aggressively relied upon a host of Restatement positions and have of-
ten prevailed where they would clearly have failed under the juris-
prudence of Section 402A,
The ensuing discussion sets forth a review of the most impor-
tant decisions decided under the new Restatement. We do not at-
tempt to cover everything. Rather, we shall identify decisions both
clearly accepting or rejecting the Restatement. We shall also take
note of cases whose position on issues raised in the Restatement are
so clear that they leave no doubt whatsoever as to how the jurispru-
dence of the state views the Restatement.
I. SECTION 1: LIABILITY FOR SALE OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
Section 1 sets forth the operative rule holding a commercial
seller of a defective product liable for harm to persons or property
caused by the defect. Every seller in the distributive chain is liable
[Vol. 27:1
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if the product left the seller's hands in a defective condition.' Sec-
tion 1, Comment e notes that a substantial number of jurisdictions
have enacted statutes immunizing non-manufacturing sellers from
strict liability so long as the manufacturer is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the court and is not insolvent. The comment observes that
statutes immunizing nonmanufacturers can be unfair to plaintiffs.
If a nonmanufacturing seller is dismissed from the action at the
outset when it appears that the manufacturer will be able to pay a
judgment, and the manufacturer subsequently becomes insolvent
and is unable to pay the judgment, the plaintiff may be left unfairly
to suffer the loss uncompensated. The Restatement advises courts to
toll statutes of limitations against nonmanufacturers in the event of
the ultimate insolvency of the manufacturer.
An Ohio court recently followed Comment e's advice. In Crego v.
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp.,2 an employee who suffered the ampu-
tation of several fingers on his right hand while operating a drum
mixer sued both the manufacturer of the mixer, and the retailer
who sold the mixer. Based on a statute that exempted a retailer
from products liability if the manufacturer was subject to the juris-
diction of the state and was not insolvent, the retailer moved for
summary judgment. Before the court could rule on the summary
judgment motion, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the complaint
against the retailer. The plaintiff later learned that the manufac-
turer was insolvent. Relying heavily on Section 1, Comment e of the
Restatement, the court equitably tolled the statute of limitations so
long as the plaintiff exercised due diligence to ascertain the sol-
vency of the manufacturer. The court remanded for a factual find-
ing as to whether the plaintiff exercised such due diligence and was
thus entitled to have the statute of limitations tolled.3
II. SECTION 2(b): LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE DESIGN
Clearly, the most controversial section in the Restatement is Sec-
tion 2(b), which provides that a product is defective in design
"when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
'RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § I cmt. e (1998) [hereinafter all
references to Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. will be Restatement]. One court
following Restatement Section 1 held a retailer liable for failure to warn even
though the retailer had acted reasonably in selling the product. Marcon v. K-Mart
Corp., 573 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).2 No. 16515, 1998 WL 80240 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1998).
'Id. at 7.
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have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable al-
ternative design.. .and the omission of the alternative design ren-
ders the product not reasonably safe.' '4 Before considering the case
law dealing with Section 2 (b), it is important to note that Section 2,
Comment b, makes it clear that proof of a reasonable alternative de-
sign is not required in every case. Three exceptions are set forth:
Section 3 provides that when circumstantial evidence sup-
ports the conclusion that a defect was a contributing cause
of the harm and that the defect existed at the time of sale,
it is unnecessary to identify the specific nature of the de-
fect and meet the requisites of § 2. Section 3 frees the plain-
tiff from the strictures of § 2 in circumstances in which common
experience teaches that an inference of defect may be warranted
under the specific facts, including the failure of the product to per-
form its manifestly intended function. When the defect estab-
lished under § 3 may involve product design, some courts
recognize consumer expectations as an adequate test for
defect, in apparent conflict with the reasonable alternative
design requirement in § 2(b). But when the claims in-
volve a product's failure to perform its manifestly in-
tended function and the other requisites of § 3 are met,
the apparent conflict disappears.
Section 4, dealing with violations of statutory and regula-
tory norms, also provides an alternate method of estab-
lishing defect. A plaintiff is not required to establish the
standard for design or warning under § 2, but merely to
identify a government-imposed standard.
Comment e provides a further qualification of the rule in
§ 2(b). This Restatement recognizes the possibility that
4Opponents of the Section 2(b) formulation argued that the Restatement should
recognize the "consumer expectation test" as an alternative grounds for liability.
For the arguments of the proponents, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 868,
882-893 (1998) [hereinafter Achieving Consensus] ;James A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron
D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 667,
671-75 (1998); Theodore S. Jankowski, Focusing on Quality and Risk: The Central Role
of Reasonable Alternatives in Evaluating Design and Warning Decisions, 36 TEX. L. REv.
283, 290-97 (1995); David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness:
"Micro-Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1661, 1662-66 (1997). The
opponents' views are reflected in Phillip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Re-
building Barriers to Jury Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabil-
ity. 61 TENN. L. REv. 1043, 1092-96 (1994); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of
Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 666-71 (1995);
Frank V. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b): The Rea-
sonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1408 (1994).
[Vol. 27:1
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product sellers may be subject to liability even absent a
reasonable alternative design when the product design is
manifestly unreasonable. When § 2(b) is read in conjunc-
tion with these other provisions that allow for other ave-
nues for determining defective design, it reflects the sub-
stantial body of case law suggesting that reasonable
alternative design is the predominant, yet not exclusive,
method for establishing defective design. (emphasis
added)
Section 2 (b)'s requirement that a plaintiff must establish a
reasonable alternative design is grounded in the theory that liability
for defective design is predicated on risk-utility balancing.' In the
overwhelming majority of cases utilizing risk-utility balancing, the
question is whether the product could have been made safer. Only
in rare instances will a product be so manifestly unreasonable that a
court may properly conclude that the entire product category
should be declared unreasonably dangerous.6 Thus, courts adopt-
ing risk-utility analysis are essentially in agreement with the Restate-
ment.7 The Restatement rejects the notion that a product can be de-
clared defective in design solely because the product fails to meet
consumer expectations This test is viewed to be so open-ended
and without content as to provide no guidance whatsoever to
'RESTATEMENT § 2 cmt. d; see also Achieving Consensus, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 868, 882-
893 (1998).
6RESTATEMENT § 2 cmt. e.7Courts that predicate liability for defective design on risk-utility balancing can
only be making one of two judgments. They can either be saying that given the
risk-utility trade offs, the product should have been made with a reasonably safer
design or that it should not have been marketed at all. Liability under the former
is captured in Section 2(b) of the Restatement. Liability based on the latter theory,
that the product is so dangerous that it should not have been marketed at all, is a
rare phenomenon limited to products whose danger level is extraordinarily high
and social utility very low. Section 2, comment e of the Restatement recognizes that
liability without proof of a reasonable alternative design may be warranted for
products whose design is manifestly unreasonable. For an extensive discussion of
this point see Achieving Consensus, supra note 4, at 882-887. Courts that apply risk-
utility balancing often say that the availability of an alternative design is a factor to
be weighed in the balance. Campbell v. Struder, Inc., 970 P.2d 389, 392 n.1 (Wyo.
1998). Care must be taken to distinguish the issue of the availability of an alterna-
tive design and the question of whether the alternative design is reasonable.
Clearly the technological availability of an alternative design is one factor to be
weighed in a risk-utility balancing. However, the ultimate answer to the risk-utility
question is whether the product as designed is acceptable or whether a reasonable
alternative design should have been adopted. For a full discussion of this point see
Achieving Consensus supra note 4, 83 CORNELL L. REV. at 888-889.
'RESTATEMENT § 2 cmt. g.
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manufacturers and courts in deciding whether a product design is
defective.
Since promulgation of the new Restatement, eight courts have
reaffirmed their commitment to risk-utility balancing as the appro-
priate theory for design defect litigation.9 Two others, Connecticut
and Kansas, have rather decisively rejected Section 2(b) and have
opted for a consumer expectations test.1° One state has rejected
9Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., No. 98-30961, 1998 WL 433803 at *11 (E.D. La.
July 28, 1998) (applying risk-utility analysis and reasonable alternative design tests
relying on 8 RESTATEMENT § 2(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 206 F.3d 548 (5" Cir.
2000); Hollister v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 530, 531 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(applying the risk-utility test and holding that Michigan law is consistent with RE-
STATEMENT § 2(b)), affd, 201 F.3d 731 (6h Cir. 1999); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc.,
450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994) (holding that, consistent with Restatement Section
2(b), "the reasonableness of choosing from among various alternative product de-
signs and adopting the safest one.. .is considered the "heart" of design defect
cases"); see also Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 500 S.E.2d 570, 571 (Ga.
1998) (adopting the risk-utility analysis for determining whether a product is
defectively designed and relying on Restatement § 2, cmt. d)); Nissan Motor Co. v.
Nave, 740 A.2d 102, 117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (requiring proof of reasonable
alternative design in determining unreasonable danger and risk-utility, although
neither party sought to invoke Restatement); In re Hunter, 729 So. 2d 1264, 1277
(Miss. 1999) (utilizing risk-utility analysis for determining defect); Cavanaugh v.
Skil Corp., 751 A.2d 518 (N.J. 2000). The New Jersey Supreme Court held that
plaintiff has the burden of proving a reasonable alternative design under Restate-
ment Section 2(b). Defendant is then free to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case
or to raise the statutory state-of-the-art defense. Where the defendant shows that
there exists no design alternative which was "practical and technically feasible," the
jury need not weigh the plaintiffs proposed design against the defendant's. Cava-
naugh, 751 A.2d at 521; Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967, 983 (N.J. 1998)
(requiring analysis of risk-utility and proof of reasonable alternative design under
Restatement § 2(b)); Green v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 205, 210 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998) ("[T]he issue upon which most claims will turn is the proof by
plaintiff of a 'reasonable alternative design' in accordance with Restatement §
2(b)); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 62 (N.M. 1995) (applying risk-
utility "in light of the technology available at the time of design or distribution.");
Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tex. 1999) (adopting risk-utility
analysis and requiring proof of reasonable alternative design under the Restatement
2(b) "as does the law in most jurisdictions"); Ford Motor Co. v, Miles, 967 S.W.2d
377, 388 (Tex. 1996) ("We have held that "if there are no safer alternatives, a
product is not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law" quoting Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex. 1995)). In addition, two jurisdictions
have applied risk-utility analysis without outright adopting Section 2(b). Lovick v.
Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 699 (Iowa 1999); Campbell v. Studer, Inc., 970 P.2d
389, 392 n.1 (Wyo. 1998).
°Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1330 (Conn. 1997)
("[C]onsumer expectation standard is now well established in Connecticut strict
products liability decisions."); Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan.
2000) ("Kansas has adopted the consumer expectation test.. .as the standard for
design defect."). For an extensive discussion of Potter arguing that the holding is
[Vol. 27:1
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both risk-utility balancing and consumer expectations as the ap-
propriate theory, choosing to rely on its statute that requires proof
that a product be "unreasonably dangerous."I1
Those who argued against the "reasonable alternative design"
requirement in the debates preceding adoption of the new Restate-
ment contended that they were fearful that courts adopting such a
requirement would demand that plaintiff prove that she had actu-
ally developed a prototype alternative design in order to establish a
prima facie case of defective design. Section 2, Comment f of the
Restatement specifically rejects such a requirement and states that
qualified expert testimony suffices eventhough no prototype has
been produced. Several courts have explicitly agreed with this
proposition. 12
III. SECTION 2 (b) COMMENT d THE DEMISE OF THE OPEN AND
OBVIOUS DANGER RULE FOR DEFECTIVE DESIGN
The rule that a manufacturer has no duty to design against
open and obvious dangers had fallen into disrepute over the last
two decades prior to adoption of the new Restatement. However,
consistent with the general structure of the Restatement, see Achieving Consensus su-
pra note 4. In Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1220
(Alaska 1998) the court continued its allegiance to the two-pronged test for design
defect allowing recovery on either the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility
test. That case is, however, consistent with the authors' contention that where
courts invoke the consumers expectations test, they are dealing with cases that
would be identically resolved under the Restatement Section 3. Achieving Consensus,
83 CORNELL L. REv. at 889-90. Where an ordinary consumer cannot draw an infer-
ence of defect from common everyday experience then risk-utility balancing must
be invoked to establish defect. For a recent case so holding in a state following the
two-pronged test for defect see Pruitt v. Gen. Motors Corp., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
"Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 65 (Mo. 1999) (expressly reject-
ing consumer expectations and risk-utility analysis and holding that neither theory
is Missouri's statutory standard, which require proof that the product be "unrea-
sonably dangerous").
"Martin v. Michelin N. Am., 92 F. Supp. 2d 745, 759-60 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (hold-
ing that, under the Restatement Section 2(b) cmt. f, "plaintiff was not required to
produce a prototype tire in order to make out a prima facie case. "[Q]ualified ex-
pert testimony on the subject suffices"); Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590
N.W.2d 525, 535 (Iowa 1999) (relying on the Restatement Section 2(b) cmt. f in
"not requiring the plaintiff to produce a prototype in order to make out a prima
facie case."); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 592 (Tex. 1999)
(holding that "plaintiffs did not have to build and test an automobile transmission
to prove a safer alternative design. A design need only be "capable of being devel-
oped" under the Restatement Section 2(b) cmt. f).
2000]
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several states stubbornly clung to this position. 3 In Ogletree v. Navis-
tar lnt'l Transp. Corp.,'4 one of the holdouts, Georgia, relying on the
Restatement, has now joined the majority. Adverting to the fact that
Georgia had earlier adopted risk-utility balancing as its test for de-
fect " (relying on an early draft of the Products Liability Restatement),
the court held that the obviousness of a danger was only one factor
to be taken into account in performing risk-utility balancing and
should not stand as a no-duty rule barring recovery.
IV. SECTION 2(b) COMMENT . POSSIBILITY OF MANIFESTLY
UNREASONABLE DESIGN
The courts generally reject the idea that products that have no
reasonable alternative design and are accompanied by adequate
warnings are defective because their risks outweigh their general
utility to society. '6 The Restatement, however, does suggest that
some products might have such a low social utility and a high de-
gree of danger that liability should attach even absent proof of a
reasonable alternative design. 7 To date, no post-Restatement case
recognizes such an exception. In McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 8 a suit
against the manufacturer of Black Talon bullets brought by victims
of a slaughter that took place on the Long Island Railroad in De-
cember, 1993 at the hands of a crazed gunman, the court refused
to recognize that Black Tallon bullets were "unreasonably danger-
ous per se." (i.e a reasonable person would conclude that the dan-
ger of the product outweighs its utility). Interestingly, Judge
Calabresi, in dissent, suggests that Black Talon bullets might meet
'Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co., 393 S.E.2d 64, 66 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that the "open and obvious rule imposes on a plaintiff the burden of proving that
the peril causing injury is latent .. "), overruled by, Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp., 500 S.E.2d 570, 571 (Ga. 1998); McCollum v. Grove Mft. Co., 293
S.E.2d 632, 636 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) ("Under our case law, a manufacturer has no
duty to.. .protect against defects and dangers that are obvious."), affd, 300 S.E.2d
374 (N.C. 1983).
"4500 S.E.2d at 575.
:
5 See generally Banks v. ICI Am., 266 Ga. 607, 469 S.E.2d 171 (1996).
'
6Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370, 381 (D. Mass. 1996) (refusing to apply
category liability against a gun manufacturer relying on Restatement (Tentative
Draft No. 2) (Section 2 cmt. d in final draft of the Restatement)). For a compre-
hensive list of authorities, seeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing
the American Products Liability Frontier: The Reflection of Liability Without Defect, 66
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1263, 1314-1322 (1991).
1"RESTATEMENT § 2 cmt. e.
8119 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 27:1
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the requisites for liability under Comment e. 9
V. SECTION 2(c), COMMENT i: INFORMED CHOICE WARNINGS
In a new comment, The Products Liability Restatement sets forth a
role for informed choice warnings. Comment i provides:
In addition to alerting users and consumers to the exis-
tence and nature of product risks so that they can, by ap-
propriate conduct during use or consumption, reduce the
risk of harm, warnings also may be needed to inform users
and consumers of nonobvious and not generally known
risks that unavoidably inhere in using or consuming the
product. Such warnings allow the user or consumer to
avoid the risk warned against by making an informed de-
cision not to purchase or use the product at all and hence
not to encounter the risk. In this context, warnings must
be provided for inherent risks that reasonably foreseeable
product users and consumers would reasonably deem ma-
terial or significant in deciding whether to use or con-
sume the product.
The new Restatement notes that the duty to provide informed
choice warnings has been imposed almost exclusively with regard
to toxic agents and pharmaceutical products because courts have
recognized a distinctive need to provide risk information so that
consumers can decide whether they wish to purchase or utilize the
product.20 Several recent cases have suggested that the duty to pro-
vide informed-choice warnings applies to other products as well. In
Watkins v. Ford Motor Co.,21 the driver and occupants of a Ford
Bronco II sued for injuries suffered when the Bronco rolled over
after the driver lost control of the vehicle. Plaintiff alleged defec-
tive design and failure to warn about the tendency of the vehicle to
roll over. The case was complicated by the fact that Georgia (the
state whose law governed the accident) has a ten-year statute of re-
pose governing negligent design claims unless the conduct of the
defendant was reckless or wanton. In reversing the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Ford, the court held that a
trier of fact could find that Ford's conduct in not choosing a more
stable design with less propensity to roll over was wanton and reck-
less. Turning to the failure to warn claim, the court noted that the
9Id. at 162 (CalabresiJ., dissenting).
"RESTATEMENT § 2 cmt. i.
21190 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 1999).
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statute does not relieve a manufacturer from liability for failing to
warn once the danger becomes known to it. The court cited post-
sale evidence that came to Ford's attention as to the magnitude of
the Ford Bronco's instability and noted that Ford had provided no
post-sale warnings to consumers.
Ford contended that even had a more complete warning been
given to consumers, it would not have prevented the accident.
Ford's expert testified that once a user made a decision to drive the
Bronco II, no warning could guard against the dangers of rollover.
The court rejected the argument, concluding that though a warn-
ing might not serve to reduce the risk of harm, it could serve to al-
low him to make an informed decision as to "whether to take the
risks warned of. 2 2 The court referred to the language of Section 2,
Comment i that provides:
Whether or not many persons would when warned, none-
theless decide to use or consume the product, warnings
are required to protect the interest of those reasonably
foreseeable users or consumers who would, based on their
own reasonable assessment of the risks and benefits, de-
cline product use or consumption.
VI. SECTION 2 (c), COMMENT j: No DUTY To WARN ABOUT OBVIOUS
DANGERS
Unlike design defects where manufacturers owe a clearly estab-
lished duty to design against open and obvious dangers when a rea-
sonable alternative design is available that could have avoided or
reduced the risk of harm, the Restatement takes the position that
manufacturers owe no duty to warn about obvious dangers." The
obviousness of the danger is the surrogate for a warning and warn-
ings about obvious and well known risks diminish the significance
of warnings and tend to clutter warning labels with useless informa-
tion. Comment j has been oft-cited by the courts.2 4 Of course,
221d. at 1219. For a similar view see Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., 1998 WL
433803 at *11 (E.D. La. July 28, 1998), rev'd, on other grounds, 206 F.3d 548 (5' Cir.
2000).2
'
3RESTATEMENT § 2 cmt. j.24E.g., McMahon v. Bunn-o-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 655-56 (7" Cir. 1998) (rely-
ing on Restatement § 2 cmt. j in holding that the defendant not required to warn
customer of obviously hot coffee); Maneely v. Gen. Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176,
1179 (9a' Cir. 1997) (citing to Restatement Section 2 cmt.j in holding that "a manu-
facturer need not provide a warning" when dangers are generally obvious); Sauder
Custom Fabrication, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. 1998) (holding, in accor-
[Vol. 27:1
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whether a risk is obvious may be a question to be submitted to the
trier of fact when reasonable minds can differ.1
5
VII. SECTION 2(c), COMMENT L: WARNINGS CANNOT SERVE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR INADEQUATE DESIGN
The Third Restatement takes a bold position directly contrary to
that set forth in Section 402A. It has been utilized aggressively by
plaintiffs in several high-profile cases. First, a brief look at history.
Restatement, (Second) of Torts, Section 402A., Commentj states that:
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume
that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing
such a warning which is safe for use if it is followed, is not
in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
This comment has come under heavy attack from academic
critics: 6 They argue that a warning should not be a panacea ex-
empting manufacturers from adopting reasonable designs. Con-
sumers often fail to read or remember warnings. Many accidents
result from user inadvertence and inattention. If a reasonable al-
ternative design could have been adopted, the manufacturer
should bear responsibility even if the danger was adequately
warned against.
The Products Liability Restatement sets an entirely new and dif-
ferent tone. It provides:
Reasonable designs and instructions or warnings both play
important roles in the production and distribution of rea-
sonably safe products. In general, when a safer design can
reasonably be designed out of a product, adoption of the
safer design in required over a warning that leaves a sig-
nificant residuum of such risks. For example, instructions
and warnings may be ineffective because users of the
product may not be adequately reached, may be likely to
be inattentive, or may be insufficiently motivated to follow
dance with Section 2 cmt. j, the manufacturer's duty to warn only extends to that
which is not obvious to the "ordinary user"); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d
379, 382 n.2 (Tex. 1995) (noting that, under Section 2 cmt.j, "the warnings of ob-
vious risks tends to undermine the effectiveness of warnings of unobvious risks").
25Maneely, 108 F.3d at 1179; Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d 303, 308 (N.Y.
1998).
26Howard Latin, Good Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive limitations, 41 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1193, 1206-07 (1994); see also Aaron D. Twerski, Alvin Weinstein, William
Donaher, & Richard Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability: De-
sign Defect Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 506 (1976).
20001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
the instructions or heed the warnings. However, when an
alternative design to avoid risks cannot reasonably be im-
plemented, adequate instructions and warnings will nor-
mally be sufficient to render the product reasonably
safe .... Warnings are not, however, a substitute for the
provision of a reasonably safe design.
In Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez,2 a mechanic was in-
jured when a 16-inch tire he was attempting to mount on a 16.5-
inch wheel exploded. The tire bore a prominent warning label
containing yellow and red highlights and a pictograph of a worker
being thrown into the air by an exploding tire. The label con-
spicuously stated that it was highly dangerous to mount a 16-inch
tire onto 16.5-inch rim and warned that serious injury or death
could result if the user failed to comply with the warning. Plaintiff
did not claim that the warning was inadequate but argued instead
that the tire was defectively designed due to its use of an 0.037
gauge multistrand wetless bead rather than an 0.050 single
stranded programmed bead. Use of the alternative design would
have prevented the injury to the plaintiff. Defendant relied on Sec-
tion 402A, Commentj and contended that a comprehensive warning
should absolve it from liability. The Texas Supreme Court, citing
the Products Liability Restatement, disagreed and upheld the jury ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff.2 9 The court noted that the presence of
a warning is a factor to be considered in deciding whether a manu-
facturer should have adopted a safer design but that it should not
stand as a barrier to the imposition of liability.!" The new Restate-
ment position was heavily relied on in Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., '
where the court upheld the refusal of trial court to instruct the jury
that an adequate warning would render the product not defective.
The court held that despite an adequate warning, availability of a
safer design could serve as a predicate for liability despite an ade-
quate warning.
VIII. SECTION 2 (b) AND (c): COMMENT m: LIABILITY FOR
FORESEEABLE RISKS
Sections 2(b) and (c) impose liability only when the foresee-
27RESTATEMENT § 2, cmt. 1.
28977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998).
2Id. at 336.
0Id.
"'144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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able risks of harm could have been avoided or reduced by the
adoption of a safer design or a warning. The requirement that the
risk of harm be foreseeable represents the overwhelming majority
opinion in the country.32 Two post-Restatement opinions have ad-
dressed the issue. In Sternhagen v. Dow Co.,33 plaintiff alleged that
he contracted cancer as a result of exposure to the spraying of a
herbicide during the years 1948-1950. Defendants raised the de-
fense that neither they, nor medical science, knew or had reason to
know of any alleged cancer-causing properties of the herbicide dur-
ing the years 1948-1950. Answering a certified question from a
federal court, the Montana Supreme Court rejected a state-of -the-
art defense.34 The court took issue with comments to both Section
402A and the Products Liability Restatement and concluded that the
"evidence that a manufacturer knew or through the exercise of rea-
sonable foresight should have known of the dangers inherent in his
product is irrelevant.
3
5
In a case decided a year later, Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp.,36 the Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed a long-standing
position that foreseeability of risk is irrelevant to a strict liability
claim. Citing the position set forth in Section 2, Comment m in the
Products Liability Restatement and the authority set forth in the Re-
porters' Notes in support of that comment, the court noted that it
was in a distinct minority of states that had heretofore applied a
hindsight analysis to the duty to warn. Recognizing the strong judi-
cial trend that imposed liability only when the risks were foresee-
12See e.g., LaMontagne v. Du Pont & Co., Inc, 41 F.3d 846, 859 (2d Cir. 1994) (ap-
plying Connecticut law and observing that duty to warn only extends to those risks
that are known or reasonably known"); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 556 (Cal. 1991) (limiting liability to "knowable" risks and not-
ing that strict liability has incorporated some well-settled principles from negli-
gence); Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Colo. 1993) (holding
state-of-the-art evidence admissible and recognizing that "a manufacturer cannot
warn of dangers that were not known to it or knowable in light of the generally
recognized and prevailing scientific and technical knowledge available at the time
of the manufacture and distribution."); Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284,
289 (Iowa 1994) ("The burden on plaintiffs [is to prove] a defendant knew or
should have known of potential risks associated with the use of its product, yet
failed to provide adequate directions or warnings to users."); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 641 (Md. 1992) (holding under Restatement (Second) Sec-
tion 402A cmt. j, that in order to be found liable, a seller must have knowledge or
reason to know of potential dangers to users of its products).
"935 P.2d 1139 (Mont. 1997).
"Id. at 1147.
15Id. at 1144.
36696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
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able or could have been discovered by reasonable testing prior to
marketing the product, the court said that it would henceforth em-
brace the Restatement position.
IX. SECTION 2: COMMENT N: REJECTING MULTIPLE DOCTRINAL
THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION
It has become commonplace for plaintiffs to allege multiple
doctrinal theories of liability for the same cause of action. Thus, in
actions for design defect and failure to warn, plaintiffs typically al-
lege separate counts in negligence, strict liability and the implied
warranty of merchantability. For those few courts that embrace the
consumer expectations test based on the implied warranty of mer-
chantability, it is justifiable to send a case to the jury both on a tort
(risk-utility) test and an implied warranty (consumer expectations)
test.38 However, for the vast majority of courts that subscribe to risk-
utility balancing for both design and failure to warn cases, sending
a case to the jury on multiple theories invites inconsistent jury ver-
dicts. For example, it is not uncommon for ajury to find a product
to be not defective yet also conclude that the defendant was negli-
gent in designing or failing to provide adequate warnings about the
product. The Restatement in Section 2, Comment n, notes that design
and warning cases are grounded in risk-utility balancing and,
whether the theory of liability is negligence, strict liability or the
implied warranty of merchantability, the essence of the claim re-
mains the same. Thus, it urges that courts not submit the same
risk-utility based case to juries on multiple theories of liability.
Courts that have confronted this issue have agreed with the Re-
statement position. 9 Some have been forced to reverse plaintiff ver-
3
7Id. at 921-922.
mE.g., Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735-36 (N.Y. 1995).
9See e.g.,Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 582, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Law-
ley v. Chevron Chem. Co., 720 So. 2d 922, 928 n.6 (Ala. 1998) ("[T]wo or more
factually identical.. .failure to warn claims.. .should not be submitted to the trier of
fact in the same case under different doctrinal labels" under Restatement § 2 cmt.
n); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1999) (holding,
under § 2 cmt. n, that plaintiff should "not be free to submit a case to ajury based
on both the implied warranty of merchantability and strict liability theories since
they are based on the factual base...."); Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 973 P.2d
1110, 1114 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Section 2 cmt. n for the proposition that,
in a design defect case under admiralty law, ajury cannot consider separately strict
liability and negligence claims). The exceptional jurisdiction refusing to follow
Restatement § 2 cmt. n is Wisconsin where dual instructions are still allowed. See
Sharp v. Case Corp., 595 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Wis. 1999) (upholding as consistent a
[Vol. 27:1
RESTA TEMENT IN THE COURTS
dicts because the jury has rendered inconsistent verdicts. For ex-
ample, in Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co.,40 a design defect case, the judge
submitted both negligence and strict liability courts to the jury.
The jury found the automobile to be nondefective but found Ford
Motor Co. negligent in designing the auto's cruise control system.
In reversing judgment on the verdict the court cited the Restatement
and said that "in New York, as in virtually all jurisdictions, in a
products liability action premised on a design defect theory, ajury
finding that a product is not defective precludes a parallel finding
that the manufacturer is negligent in designing the product. ' 41 In-
deed, the court expressed displeasure with counsel for both plain-
tiff and defendant for not alerting it to the identical nature of the
claims and the possibility that instructing on multiple theories
would lead to inconsistent verdicts.
4 2
X. SECTION 3: DRAWING INFERENCE OF DEFECT WITHOUT THE
NECESSITY OF PROVING SPECIFIC DEFECT
Ofttimes a product causes injury in such a manner that com-
mon sense tells us that the product must have been defective. Sec-
tion 3 recognizes that when the incident that harmed the plaintiff
was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect
and when one can fairly exclude other causes as the sole cause of
the injury it is not necessary to identify the specific defect that was
responsible for injury-causing event.43 When such a common sense
inference of defect can be drawn, courts often observe that the
product failed consumer expectations. Indeed, most of the cases
cited by courts supporting a consumer expectations test are of this
44
genre.
jury verdict allowing "recovery for the negligent design of a product even though
the product [was] not unreasonably dangerous in a strict product liability sense.").
4069 F. Supp. 2d 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
4Id. at 606; see also Lawley, 720 So. 2d at 928-29; Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d at 667-68;
Lecy, 973 P.2d at 1116.
42Jarvis, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 587 n.8.
RESTATEMENT § 3.
44See e.g., Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(stating "[E]vidence of the nature of an accident itself may, under certain circum-
stances, give rise to a reasonable inference that the product was defective because
the circumstances of the product's failure may be such as to frustrate the ordinary
consumer expectations of its continued performance"); Tulgetske v. R.D. Werner
Co., Inc., 408 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that plaintiff can make
out a strict liability claim by proving product failed to perform reasonably in light
of its intended function); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 502
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Drawing a common sense inference of defect from the occur-
rence of an injury- causing event has a well known analog in the
general law of torts. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur courts
have recognized that an inference of negligence may be drawn
when the defendant's negligence is the best explanation for the
cause of an accident, even if the plaintiff cannot explain the exact
nature of the defendant's wrongful conduct. 45 Because the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur has been historically connected to negli-
gence, many courts have said that it does not apply to products li-
ability cases.46 Courts seek out different articulations to support
liability in cases where the inferential process should lead to a find-
ing of liability without the necessity of establishing whether the
product failed due to a manufacturing defect or a defective design.
As noted, some courts invoke the consumer expectations test as the
reason for imposing liability;47 others rely on something called the
"malfunction theory" of liability. 4" At bottom the elements of this
cause of action are the same as those set forth in Section 3 of the
Products Liability Restatement. Section 3 provides:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff
was caused by a product defect existing at the time of sale
or distribution, without proof of a specific defect, when
the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of
product defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of
causes other than product defect existing at the time of
sale or distribution.
N.E.2d 651, 654 (Ohio App. Ct. 1993) (holding that in a fire case, "the reasonable
expectations of the buyer of a motor vehicle is that the main electrical cable har-
ness of such vehicle will not start a fire").
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 328D (1965).
41See generally Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 211 (7"' Cir. 1994);
Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 579 So. 2d 1328, 1333 (Ala. 1991); Tre-
sham v. Ford Motor Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 403, 407 (1969); Myrlak v. Port Auth. of
N.Y & N.J., 723 A.2d 45, 54 (N.J. 1999).
"'Supra note 44.
41See e.g., Troy v. Kampgrounds of Am., Inc., 581 A.2d 665, 668 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990) ("The 'malfunction' theory of products liability encompasses nothing more
than circumstantial evidence of product malfunction"); Anderson v. Chrysler
Corp., 403 S.E.2d 189, 194 (W. Va. 1991) (" [W]e hold that circumstantial evidence
may be sufficient to make a prima facie case in the strict liability action, even
though the precise nature of the defect cannot be identified, so long as the evi-
dence shows that a malfunction in the product occurred that would not ordinarily
happen in the absence of a defect.").
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In Myrlak v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,49 the New
Jersey Supreme Court adopted Section 3, noting that it accom-
plishes for product defect cases that which res ipsa did for negli-
gence cases. The court noted its agreement with those states that
allow an inference of defect to be drawn when "common experi-
ence indicates that certain accidents do not occur absent some de-
fect."'
50
XI. SECTION 5: LIABILITY FOR SELLERS OF COMPONENT PARTS
Section 5 has been enormously influential. It has been cited
favorably in a host of cases and is likely to put to rest this vexatious
issue. Very simply, Section 5 provides that the seller of a compo-
nent part which is not itself defective is not liable for harm caused
by a product into which the component was integrated unless the
seller of the component substantially participates in the integration
of the component into the design of the product.1 Most often
component part sellers are brought into litigation when the manu-
facturer of the product into which the component has been inte-
grated is insolvent. For the most part, component part sellers are in
no position to monitor how the components are utilized by end-
manufacturers. If liability were to be imposed on component sell-
ers, they would have to develop "sufficient sophistication to review
the decisions of the business entities that are already charged with
the responsibility for the integrated product. 52 Placing such a duty
on component part manufacturers is not practically feasible and
would result in enormous economic inefficiency.
The first case to apply Section 5 was Zaza v. Marquess & Nell,
Inc.53 In that case defendant, a sheet metal fabricator manufac-
tured a quench tank to specifications. The specifications did not
require that the fabricator prepare or install any safety devices. In-
stead, the specifications called for the fabricator to cut holes for the
safety devices. When the quench tank was ultimately integrated
into a working regeneration system, the safety devices were not in-
"723 A.2d 45 (NJ. 1999).
50Id. at 56; see also Urbach v. Indus. Chem., No. A-96-368, 1997 WL 576595 at *7
(Neb. Ct. App. Sep. 9, 1997) (citing to Restatement Section 3 in permitting plaintiff
to present circumstantial evidence "since it is unrealistic to expect a plaintiff to
otherwise prove that a particular product was sold in a defective condition").
51RESTATEMENT § 5.
52Id. at cmt. a.
"675 A.2d 620 (N.J. 1996).
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stalled. The plaintiff alleged that the fabricator had a non-
delegable duty to see to it that the quench tank was properly inte-
grated into the regeneration system utilizing the safety devices. He
also alleged that the defendant had a duty to warn of the dangers
of operating the quench tank without safety devices. The court
found that the quench tank was not itself defective. It reasoned
that it was not feasible for a sheet metal fabricator such as the com-
ponent manufacturer to attach safety devices to a quench tank nor
was it reasonable for the fabricator to provide warnings to the end-
product manufacturer about the dangers attendant to using the
product without such safety devices. 4 According to the court, that
responsibility resided with the party charged with integrating the
entire system and should not fall on the manufacturer of the com-
ponent part. Recent decisions have absolved manufacturers of
such components as teflon used in medical implants, 55 silicone used•56 5
in breast implants, raw asbestos used in insulation 57 and a wing
pulley that was to be integrated into a conveyor belt system. 58
Courts have been careful in applying the exception that im-
poses liability if there has been substantial participation by the
54Id. at 634-35.55See generally Kealoha v. Du Pont Co., 82 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (not citing to Re-
statement); In reTMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 872 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Minn. 1995)
(not citing to Restatement).56In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F. Supp. 1110, 1114
(N.D. Ala. 1997) (relying on Restatement Section 5 in affirming grant of summary
judgment to defendant and holding "raw material manufacturers.., not subject
to liability for harm caused by defective design of the end product"); In re Silicone
Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (N.D. Ala. 1995)
(granting summary judgment to manufacturer of bulk foam used in breast im-
plants citin g to Restatement, Tentative Draft, No. 2); Artiglio v. Gen. Elec. Co., 61
Cal. App. 4 830, 839 (1998) (holding, in accordance with Section 5, "component
and raw material suppliers are not liable to the ultimate consumers when . . they
sell goods to a sophisticated buyer").
57Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 334 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth Cir-
cuit predicted that Texas would follow Restatement Section 5 and accordingly
held that a seller of raw asbestos which was not defective in itself was not liable
when the asbestos is integrated into an end-product. Id. But see Arena v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (citing to §
5 but holding that raw asbestos is a defective product in itself and is not an in-
nocuous component material such as sand or gravel).5 Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712, 716 (R.I. 1999) (adopting Re-
statement § 5); see also Cipollone v. Yale Industrial Prod., Inc., 202 F.3d 376, 379
(1" Cir. 2000) (relying on Restatement Section 5 in holding that under Massachu-
setts law, a manufacturer of a customized dock-lift that was a component of a ma-
terial-handling system was not liable since the component part was not defective
itself).
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component maker in the integration of the component into the
design of the integrated product. 9 The mere provision of technical
support and general processing advice does not sufficiently impli-
cate the component part seller in the design process.60 However,
presented with evidence of more substantial involvement, courts
have been willing to impose liability.61 This is an area where the
courts are keenly aware of the serious economic ramifications of
imposing liability on a party who is most often not in a position to
control the design of the end- product and have been cautious
about imposing liability for either defective design or failure to
62
warn.
XII. SECTION 6: LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
AND MEDICAL DEVICES
Two aspects of the Restatement's treatment of liability for pre-
scription drugs have been dealt with by the courts. The first deals
with the issue of liability for defective drug design. Section 6(c)
imposes liability for defective drug design only if the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the drug are sufficiently great in relation to
its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care
providers knowing of such foreseeable risks and benefits would not
prescribe the drug for any class of patients. 63 If a class of patients
exists for whom the drug is the reasonable therapeutic choice, the
drug is not defectively designed. It has a legitimate place on the
market if sold with fully adequate warnings. However, if another
FDA approved drug is available on the market that provides the
benefits of the drug in question and has reduced risk of harm or
side effects, presumably no reasonable health-care provider would
59See e.g., In re Silcone Gel Breast Implants, 996 F. Supp. at 1116 (citing to § 5 cmt.
e, illus. 6); Artiglio, 61 Cal. App. at 840.
"RESTATEMENT § 5 cmt. e.61Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 716 (recognizing Restatement Section 5(b) (1) and remand-
ing for trial to determine whether the manufacturer had "substantially partici-
pated in the integration of the component into the design of the final product").
Supra note 54; see also Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305,
313 (3d Cir. 1999) (refusing, under Restatement § 5, to hold liable a manufacturer
of fertilizer used in producing bomb that terrorists set off in the World Trade Cen-
ter); Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l. Trans. Corp., 511 S.E.2d 204, 209 n.22 (Ga. 1999)
(citing § 5 in recognizing that sellers of component parts are not ordinarily "liable
for failing to incorporate a safety feature that is peculiar to the specific adaptation
for which another utilizes the incomplete product").
"RESTATEMENT § 6 (c).
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prescribe the riskier drug.64 Recent events suggest that FDA ap-
proved drugs have remained on the market even when other FDA
approved drugs with the same benefits and lesser risks were avail-
able.6' Ultimately, the more dangerous drugs are either voluntarily
withdrawn from the market by the manufacturer or ultimately
banned by the FDA. 66 The Restatement rejects the notion, however,
that courts should be able to declare drugs defective because the
drug manufacturer failed to develop a reasonable alternative de-
sign for the drug. New drugs can only be approved in this country
after a very extensive and rigorous approval process by the FDA.
Such a review generally takes about twelve years to complete and
costs more than $200 million dollars to perform.6' The courtroom
cannot replicate this approval process. To allow a plaintiff to make
out a design claim that is less rigorous than the FDA approval proc-
ess is to indulge in rank speculation as to whether an alternative
drug could legitimately reach the commercial drug market. Several
courts have indicated general approval of Section 6(c).6"
64But see George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability?, 109 YALE L. REv. 1087, 1102 (2000). Conk argues that Section
6(c) would insulate a manufacturer from liability if the product unnecessarily
caused harm in that there is a feasible safer design available. The authors believe
that Conk has misread Section 6(c) since, if there was available on the market an
FDA approved drug that provides the benefits of the drug in question with lesser
risks, no reasonable medical provider would prescribe the drug in question.
"'Denise Grady, Doctors Call for Caution on Two More Diabetes Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, A10,
May 20, 2000. Rezulin, a drug used by diabetes sufferers, remained on the market
until recently despite availability of two apparently "safer" drugs, Avandia and Ac-
tos. Id.
6"Id. Rezulin remained on the market until there were ninety attributed cases of
liver failure resulting in sixty-three deaths before the FDA ordered Rezulin re-
moved from the market. Id.
67For a description of the exhaustive nature of the FDA approval process, see Mi-
chael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case,
30 U. OF MICH.J. L. Ref. 461, 485-488 (1997).
""Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 184-5 (D. Ariz. 1999) (predicting that
Arizona would adopt Section 6(c) and granting summary judgment to drug manu-
facturer since plaintiff did not demonstrate that a reasonable health care provider
would not prescribe the drug "Anglechich" for any class of patients); Sita v. Danek
Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (relying on Restatement Section
6(c) in granting summary judgment to defendant manufacturer of surgical screw
systems used in spinal surgeries); Jones v. Sofamor, S.N.C., No. 1:96-CV-3167, 1999
WL 1062103 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 1999) (stating that, in a case involving design de-
fect claim against manufacturer of surgical screws, Restatement Section 6(c) appears
to be sound. However, in the absence of Georgia case law, the Court granted
summary judgment for defendant because plaintiff did not present an adequate
risk-utility case); Taylor v. Danek Med., Inc., No. Civ. A. 95-7232 1998 WL 962062,
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1998) (predicting that Pennsylvania will adopt Restatement
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The second aspect of Section 6 that has been influential is that
dealing with the applicability of the "learned intermediary" rule
when drug manufacturers advertise their drugs to the public. Tra-
ditionally, a drug manufacturer fulfils its obligation to warn when it
directs warnings concerning risks associated with a drug to health-
care providers who prescribe the drug.69 The Restatement recognizes
a duty to warn the patient directly when the manufacturer knows or
has reason to know that the health-care provider will not be in a
position to reduce the risk of harm in accordance with the warn-
ings. 7 Thus, with regard to vaccines that are administered in clin-
ics without the participation of physicians who can evaluate or
communicate the risk of inoculation, courts have found a duty to
warn patients directly if such warnings are feasible." A more diffi-
cult question arises with regard to drugs that are marketed through
direct advertising to patients but cannot be purchased by the pa-
tient without a physician's prescription. In Section 6, Comment e,
the Restatement recognizes that a strong argument can be made
that, given direct advertising to patients, the learned intermediary
rule should not protect drug manufacturers from claims that their
advertisements do not adequately inform patients of the risks at-
tached to use of the drug. Nonetheless, the Restatement leaves to
developing case law the question of whether an exception to the
learned intermediary rule should be recognized for drugs that are
advertised to the public.72 In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc.,73 the
Section 6(c). For articles generally approving Section 6(c) but arguing that there
may be instances where a reasonable alternative drug design may be established,
see Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement
(Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L.. REV. 207 (1999); and William A.
Drier, Manufacturers' Liability For Drug and Medical Devices Under the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 258 (1999).
"'RESTATEMENT § 6(d) (1). For cases citing to this Section, see, e.g., Vitanza v. Up-
john Co., No. 99-7539, 2000 WL 545245 (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2000) (granting sum-
mary judgment for defendant on grounds that the learned intermediary doctrine
barred claim); Uribe v. Sofamos, No. 8:95CV464, 1999 WL 1129703 (D. Neb. Aug.
16, 1999) (holding that where a user or learned intermediary is fully aware of in-
herent dangers of a product, there is no proximate causation).
7°RESTATEMENT § 6(d) (2).
7"E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1271 (5"f Cir. 1974) (applying Texas
law); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121,131 (9 h Cir. 1968); Tenuto v. Lederle Lab.,
695 N.Y.S.2d 259 (S. Ct. Richmond Co. 1999) (citing to Section 6(d) (1) and hold-
ing learned intermediary defense inapplicable when drug manufacturer failed to
warn learned intermediary of ways to avoid risks involved in administering polio
vaccine).
72RESTATEMENT§ 6(d)(2) cmt. e.
7734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
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New Jersey Supreme Court, reviewed the relevant Restatement sec-
tions, and clearly held that the "learned intermediary" rule would
not necessarily shield manufacturers from liability for drugs com-
mercially advertised. Thus, even ample warnings to physicians will
not protect a drug manufacturer from liability if its public adver-
tisements do not adequately inform consumers of risks associated
with use of the drug.
XIII. SECTION 10: POST-SALE FAILURE To WARN
The Products Liability Restatement recognizes a cause of action
not even hinted at in Section 402A. Even when a product is not de-
fective at the time of sale, a manufacturer may be subject to liability
if it subsequently learns of dangers attendant to the use of the
product or methods to avoid serious risks and fails reasonably to
communicate that information to product users.4 The Restatement
recognizes that the imposition of a post-sale duty to warn is more
onerous than imposing a duty to warn at the time of original sale.75
Including a warning accompanying the sale of a product is rela-
tively easy. Communicating with consumers many years after they
have purchased the product typically entails considerable difficulty.
Section 10 sets forth the special elements that must be considered
76before concluding that a seller has a post -sale duty to warn.
Several cases have considered Section 10. In Lovick v. Wil-
Rich,77 the Iowa Supreme Court adopted section 10 as the govern-
ing rule for post-sale duty to warn in that state. Holding inade-
quate a lower court's instruction on post-sale warning because it did
not alert the jury to the special considerations that the Restatement
sets forth as requisites for finding a post-sale duty, the court re-
78manded the case for retrial on that issue. However, an intermedi-
ate appellate court in Pennsylvania in DeSantis v. Frick Co.,79 rejected
Section 10, concluding that, in the absence of original defect in the
7
*RESTATEMENT § 10.
51d. at § 10 cmt. a.76Id. at § 10(b) (1)-(4).
77588 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa 1999). See also Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d 303,
307 n.3 (N.Y. 1998) (citing § 10 with approval).
78Lovick, 588 N.W.2d at 695-96. See also Lewis v. Ariens, 729 N.E.2d 323,326 (Mass.
2000) (holding that Restatement Section 10(b) (2) liability for a post-sale failure to
warn will not be imposed for injury suffered by second hand purchasers because
the burden of communicating to them would be onerous).
79745 A.2d 624 (Pa. 1999). See also Modelski v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 707
N.E.2d 239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (refusing to recognize post-sale failure to warn).
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product, no post-sale duty to warn would be recognized. Thus, ac-
cording to the court, a post-sale duty to warn exists only if the
product was defective at the time of sale.80 One wonders why the
post-sale warning is simply not surplusage if the product was defec-
tive at time of sale. The true function of a post-sale warning is to
provide a remedy for a plaintiff who was not warned about a risk or
risk-avoidance measure when that information was not available at
time of original sale.
XIV. SECTION 16: CRASHWORTHINESS-LIABILITY OF SELLERS WHEN
THE ADD-ON DAMAGES CANNOT BE QUANTIFIED
Section 16 addresses a problem that arises occasionally in
"crashworthiness" cases." A plaintiff who brings an action against
an auto manufacturer for injuries suffered as a result of the fact
that the auto did not provide for adequate safety in the event of a
collision is entitled to recover only for those injuries that were in-
creased as a result of the lack of crashworthiness.82 Injuries that
would have been suffered even had the car been reasonably crash-
worthy are not proximately caused by the auto manufacturer. They
are the result of the happening of the accident. Most often plain-
tiffs are able to establish with considerable precision the nature of
the add-on injuries that were caused by the absence of the safety
feature that rendered the auto defective. On occasion, a plaintiffs
expert can only opine that the desired safety feature would have
reduced the plaintiffs injuries but cannot quantify the extent of the
injury reduction. A majority of courts take the position that as long
as the plaintiff establishes that the injuries that occurred exceed
those that would have resulted from the accident in any event,
plaintiff is entitled to recover the entirety of the damages suffered.83
A minority of courts deny the plaintiff recovery in that circum-
Id. at 630.
"Restatement Section 16 addresses the issue of liability for increased harm due to
product defect. Enhanced injury cases arise most frequently in claims based on an
automobile classification. However, other products can bring about claims for in-
creased harm. E.g., Tafoya v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d 1330 (10" Cir. 1989)
(riding lawnmower); Roe v. Deere & Co., 855 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1988) (agricultural
tractor); McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(airplane); Farrell v. John Deere Co., 443 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (corn
picker).
2RESTATEMENT, § 16(b); Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp. 391 F.2d 495, 503 (1968).
"For a list of states following the majority rule see RESTATEMENT §16 cmt. d Re-
porters' Notes at 242-250.
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stance, insisting that if plaintiff cannot quantify the add-on dam-
ages, plaintiff cannot recover.8 4 The Restatement sides with the ma-
jority view allowing plaintiffs recovery."'
Since the advent of the Restatement, four courts have addressed
the issue just described and each has adopted the Restatement posi-
tion."" It is interesting to note that Huddell v. Levin 7 long regarded
as the leading case espousing the minority position, is almost cer-
tainly no longer valid authority. Huddell was decided by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1976. The court's Erie-guess was that
New Jersey would require the plaintiff to quantify damages and if
plaintiff failed to do so, recovery word be barred. Two New Jersey
intermediate appellate courts have now concluded that New Jersey
would not follow Huddell and instead would follow Section 16 of
the new Restatement.8s Once again, a strong pro-plaintiff position
was espoused by the Restatement and appears now to be carrying the
day.
XV. CONCLUSION
Consistent with the decisions referred above, one may fairly
conclude that the Products Liability Restatement has been well re-
ceived by American courts. In addition to the sections set forth in
the body of the article, considerable case law has followed sections
of the Restatement dealing with such issues as the role of compara-
tive responsibility,88 the liability of successors for harm caused by
defective products sold by a predecessor, 9 and the exclusion of
8 For a list of states adhering to the minority rule see RESTATEMENT § 16 cmt. d Re-
porters' Notes at 250-251.
' RESTATEMENT § 16(c).
"Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1219-20 (Alaska 1998); Lally v.
Volkswagon Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 36-37 (Mass. 1998); Poliseno v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 744 A.2d 679, 686 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); Green v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 205, 214-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); cert. de-
nied, 718 A.2d 1210 (N.J. 1998). See also Trull v. Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 187 F.3d
88 (1" Cir. 1999) (certifying the question as to whether New Hampshire would
adopt Section 16(c) to the New Hampshire Supreme Court).
87537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
88Poliseno, supra note 86; Green, supra note 86.
.Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861, 866 (Ariz. 1995); Webb v. Navistar
Int'l Transp. Corp., 692 A.2d 343 (Vt. 1997).
90See e.g., Corbin v. Farmex, Inc., 490 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (follow-
ing Section 12); City of New York v. Pfizer, 688 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (N.Y. App. div.
1999) (following Section 12(b)); Lockheed Martin v. Gordon, 16 S.W.3d 127 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2000) (applying Delaware law that follows RESTATEMENT Section 12). But
see, LeFever v. K.F. Hounanian Enter., 734 A.2d 290, 294 (N.J. 1999) (criticizing
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economic loss arising from harm to the product itself from the law
of products liability.' It is, of course, impossible to measure em-
pirically the actual influence of the Products Liability Restatement on
the courts. Discussions dealing with the Restatement are intertwined
with discussion of the law in other jurisdictions and considerable
talk of policy considerations that moved the courts in one direction
or another. Nonetheless, in many cases discussion of the Restate-
ment is extensive and thoughtful and gives evidence that the courts
have considered the Restatement's positions seriously. Even where
courts have disagreed, we believe that the Products Liability Restate-
ment has helped sharpen the issues and shape the debate. The goal
of a Restatement is not only to restate the law and choose between
competing rules. It is to get behind the verbiage of the cases and to
make sense out of the vast body of case law. Initial evidence indi-
cates that the Products Liability Restatement has fulfilled that task.
Restatement Section 12); Saez v. S&S Corrugated Paper Mach. Co., 695 A.2d 740
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (noting that NewJersey is one of a small minority
of states to have rejected the rule set forth in Restatement Section 12).
91See e.g., Koss Constr. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 960 P.2d 255, 260 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998)
(adopting Section 21(c)); Steiner v. Ford Motor Co., No. 990155, 2000 WL
1996112 (N.D. Feb. 22, 2000) (citing Section 21, that damages to the product itself
cannot be recoverable in tort); Clarys v. Ford Motor Co., 592 N.W.2d 573, 577-78
(N.D. 1999) (finding that Section 21 comports with the Court's interpretation of
its own statute); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 592 N.W. 201,
216 (Wis. 1999) (following Section 21).
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